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It may seem strange that most litigants of trademark and patent actions in
the Republic of China on Taiwan (hereinafter referred as "ROC") are either
foreign enterprises or domestically incorporated but foreign-invested corpora-
tions. Nevertheless, this fact is evidenced by officially reported judicial deci-
sions reported. A collection and brief analysis of some important cases in these
two areas of law should be constructive for international lawyers inasmuch as
such an effort may at least suggest answers to the following basic queries:
(1) Who are these foreign litigants? (2) What issues are frequently raised in
such actions? (3) To what extent will foreign elements of a case complicate its
outcome? (4) Will a United States court reach the same conclusion if the same
case is presented? and (5) Is the Chinese court fair and just in handling cases
involving foreign entities?
Before discussing these cases, it should first be noted that infringements of
foreign patents and trademarks are common.' Some Chinese find it the easiest
way to make a fortune by employing foreign patented formulae or processes in
their manufacture of goods or imitating foreign well-known trademarks in
selling commodities. When the trademark owner or patentee discovers some
*For the sake of convenience, the following abbreviations are used in this study:
AAD: Administrative Appeal Decision
ACJ: Administrative Court Judgment
GJY: Gazette of the Judicial Yuan
GMOEA: Gazette of the Ministry of Economic Affairs
MNE: Multinational Enterprise
MOEA: Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC
NBS: National Bureau of Standards, MOEA
ROC: Republic of China
1In 1969, MOEA issued an order prohibiting imitation of foreign trademarks, See MOEA Order
No. Ching-Tai-(58)-Shang-10693 dated March 31, 1969, GMOEA, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1969), p. 34.
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infringement of his right, he usually asks his attorney to send a warning letter
to the imitator requesting that he descontinue the imitation immediately. In
some cases, that will be sufficient to induce the imitator to discontinue the im-
itation voluntarily. For example, the following letter was received by the at-
torney representing Merck & Co., Inc., U.S.A., six days after the attorney sent
a warning letter to Tien Sheng Enterprises Ltd., a local company:
Your letter dated August 4, 1971 has been received and duly noted. Following is
our reply to the various points contained in your request:
(1) Prior to the receipt of your letter, we had no knowledge of the fact that your
client, Merck & Co., Inc., had obtained the exclusive right to use the AM-
PROL PLUS trademark.
(2) We have in our possession a written authorization issued by TAD of West
Germany to sell such products in Taiwan.
(3) We fully agree henceforth not to import and sell pharmaceutical goods bear-
ing the said trademark and we hereby undertake to pay absolute respect to the
exclusive right of Merck & Co., Inc. to use the trademark.
(4) We do not have pysical possession of the Permit for Import of Animal Drugs
issued by the Taipei Municipal Government.
In some cases, however, the imitator may simply ignore the warning. The
following letter, sent to Convair Enterprises Co., Ltd. by the attorney
representing California Packing Corporation, U.S.A., is a case in point:2
At the request of my clients, Messrs. California Packing Corporation, I convey
you their statement as follows:
As you are aware, for many years we have adopted the DEL MONTE Colored
Label (a red heart shaped like a shield on a green background with yellow rim
around) as the trademark for our food products, which have enjoyed world-wide
sales. This trademark has also been registered for exclusive use in the Republic of
China. However, as reported, Convair Enterprise Co. Ltd. of Taipei has, for
deceptive purposes, used a label of identical colors with a shield-like design on a
green background as the trademark for their product of canned asparagus. In-
asmuch as such label has all the same design and coloring as our registered and
such imitation is an abvious violation of law, Mr. XX, Attorney-at-law, did, at our
request, by a letter dated November 10, 1966, notify the said Convair Enterprise
Co. Ltd. to immediately stop use of the imitated trademark, collect back all their
marketed goods labeled with such imitated trademark, destroy all remaining labels
and advertising devices showing such imitated trademark, and guarantee in writing
that they would hereafter refrain from imitating any of our registered trademarks.
Although they did give such written guaranty on November 15, 1966, as an overt
act of compliance, they have in fact continued their illicit practice just the same. In
this light, it appears that the responsible persons of the said company should be
suspected of the offence specified in Article 253 of the Criminal Code, and should,
moreover, be held liable, jointly and severally with the said Company, for damages
in respect of their act of infringement. Accordingly, you are hereby requested to
serve notice again on the said company, enjoining them to stop such infringment
within a prescribed time limit and to indicate, for our consideration, the amount of
2This case is really a shame in view of the fact that Taiwan is one of the largest exporters of
canned asparagus in the world.
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damages they are prepared to pay, failing which you are requested to bring a suit in
accordance with law.
In view of the foregoing, you are hereby notified to give the matter your prompt
attention, take action accordingly, and give a reply within ten days from receipt of
this letter.
If the imitator failed to comply with this second warning, a criminal and/or
a civil case was likely to be instituted. However, it is virtually impossible to
find such cases since the decisions of the District Court and the High Court are
not reported, and judgments of the Supreme Court of the Republic of China
are only selectively reported. But thus far no contested patent or trademark
cases involving foreign enterprises have reached this Court. For this reason the
summary which follows will center on administrative cases3 contesting the
validity or registerability of a trademark or patent.
II. Trademark Cases
The most litigated article in the Trademark Law4 of the ROC is Article 37
which reads in part as follows:
Application for registration of a trademark the device of which falls under any one
of the following circumstances shall not be made:
(6) Anything likely to disturb public order or corrupt good morals, or to deceive
the public or cause the public to have a misbelief;
(7) Anything identical with or similar to a world-famous mark or symbol owned
by another person to cover the same good or goods in the same group;
(10) Containing words, drawings, symbols, or any combination thereof, represen-
ting the customarily used name, shape, quality, usefullness or other description of the
commodity for which an application for trademark registration is made.
(12) Anything identical with or similar to another person's registered trademark
used for the same goods or for goods in the same group, or anything identical with or
similar to such registered trademark the registration of which has expired less than
one full year. This does not apply, however, in a case where the registered trademark
has not been used for one year before the registration loses its validity.
Of these, items 7 and 12, namely, the issue of similarity and protection of world-
famous mark, because of their recurring importance, merit our attention first.
1. The Issue of Similarity and
Protection of World-Famous Marks
A. THE TWO COCA-COLA CASES
In 1957, a local company called Chu Shui Hsuan Foodstuff Co., Ltd.
3Such actions are brought either by or against governmental agencies entrusted with the ad-
ministration of the patent and trademark laws. The National Bureau of Standards is now the
authority in charge of registration of trademarks and patents. Under the current court system of
the Republic of China, a special court named "Administrative Court" is authorized to decide
disputes arising from administrative actions taken by various agencies of the executive branch.4The Trademark Law of the ROC was first promulgated on May 6, 1930 effective January 1,
1931.
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(hereinafter referred to as "CHS") applied for registration of its trademark
"Chu Shui Ches Cola." The application was found by the examiner to be in
conformity to law and was granted. The mark was then published in the
Trademark Gazette for possible oppositions by interested parties., An opposi-
tion proceeding was duly instituted by the Coca-Cola Company, U.S.A., the
most well-known soft drink manufacturer in the world, against that
trademark. This opposition proceeding was allowed by the National Bureau of
Standards (NBS) and the original approval was revoked.
Dissatisfied with this revocation decision, CHS filed an administrative ap-
peal with the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA). The appeal was subse-
quently denied by the MOEA, the Executive Yuan and the Administrative
Court for the reason that "Chu Shui Ches Cola" was similar to the registered
trademark "Coca-Cola 6."
In its petition filed with the Administrative Court, CHS advanced the
following arguments:
(1) Cola is a kind of tree found in Africa. It has long become the name of a
commodity and the Coca-Cola Company may not claim the exclusive use of it.
This term has been used in many countries around the world, even including
Communist countries, to designate some sort of soft drink. In China before
1949, there were such trademarks as "Mei Chuan Cola" and "Ar Fu Cola."
In Taiwan after 1949, there was such a trademark as "Vita Cola', and 'Hei
Sung Cola" was applying for registration. Moreover, as informed by The
Pepsi-Cola Company, U.S.A, that company had registered its trademark
"Pepsi-Cola" in more than 88 countries.
(2) The Coca-Cola Company did not separately register the term "Cola."
Only "Coca" was the major part of its trademark. Since "Chu Shui Ches"
was completely different from "Coca" in meaning, pronunciation, design and
color, it was unreasonable to rule that the two trademarks were similar to each
other.
(3) Although it might be true that The Coca-Cola Company had won a few
cases involving the same issue in a few developing countries, it was well
established that the said company had lost its case in many countries such as
the United States,7 Japan, the United Kingdom, and Canada. It was clearly the
intention of The Coca-Cola Company to monopolize the soft drink industry in
5Under Article 24 of the then Trademark Law (now Article 41), a trademark will be granted
registration if no interested party has instituted opposition proceedings against it within six months
(now three months) or if any such proceedings instituted have been successfully overcome.6Under Article 2, item 12 of the then Trademark Law (now Article 37, item 12), a design being
identical with or similar to a registered trademark of another person for the same goods or goods
in the same group is not eligible for trademark registration.7See, e.g., Dixi-Cola Laboratories, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 48 USPQ 164, 117 F. 2d 352 (4th Cir.
1941).
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underdeveloped countries by excluding others from using the term "Cola,"
and had become a customarily used symbol for some type of soft drink.
The arguments advanced by NBS as defendant, and The Coca-Cola Com-
pany as an intervening party were developed as follows:
(1) Coca-Cola was a drink first produced in 1886, and the trademark was
first registered in the United States in 1893. It has been a valid trademark since
then and has been registered in more than 140 countries. Because of the Com-
pany's advertisement and quality control efforts, it is beyond a doubt that the
said trademark has become a world-famous mark. The product had been
marketed in China before 1949 almost all over the country. In Taiwan,
although banned from import, such a product was still sold in the open
market.
(2) "Cola" was an integrated part of the registered trademark and could
not be separated from it. Viewed as a whole, it was not a customarily used
term to designate some sort of soft drink. Even it was assumed the "Cola
drink" was a customarily used term in the United States, it was not neccessari-
ly true in Taiwan, due to its different environment.
In dismissing the case, the court made the following points:8
(1) "Coca-Cola" should be viewed as a whole, and "Coca" and "Cola"
are all major parts of the registered trademark. A person may not use the ma-
jor part of a registered trademark as a part of his own trademark, nor was the
information furnished by various trade associations sufficient to prove that
"Cola" had become a customarily used term to designate the com-
modity-soft drink. Even if it were assumed that it had become a customarily
used term, plaintiff may use this term to describe only the content or quality of
its product and may not use this term as a major part of its trademark.
(2) The three trademarks mentioned by the plaintiff, namely, Mei Chuan
Cola, Ar Fu Cola and Vita Cola, had been declared as null and void by NBS
and could not be cited to support this case.
It should be noted that the court's view was a very conservative one. In this
writer's opinion, the case should have been reversed for the reason that the
term "Cola" had become a customarily used name for soft drink and it was
extremely unlikely that anyone would confuse "Chu Shui Ches Cola" with
Coca-Cola. 9
In 1958, i.e., before the above decision was handed down, CSH filed
another application for registration of the trademark "Chu Shui Cola." It
should be noted that this "Chu" is a different Chinese character, although
8Chu Shui Shuan Foodstuff Co., Ltd. v. NBS, ACJ No. 51-Pan-254 dated July 21, 1962, GJY,
Vol. 4, No. 10 (1962), pp. 25-29.
9The late Professor H. Y. Ho also adopted the same view. See Ho, A STUDY OF THE INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY (Taipei, 1969), p. 158.
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having the same pronunciation as that in "Chu Shui Ches Cola." After the ap-
plication was granted the Coca-Cola Company filed a request for review of the
case with the NBS. As a result, the registration of "Chu Shui Cola" was again
declared void. The case finally went to the Administrative Court. Arguments
along the lines of those made in the above case were advanced by the parties
concerned. The court did not overturn its previous decision on the issue of
similarity. But in addition to that issue, the court further considered the matter
of protection of a world-famous mark.
In this connection, the court cited one interpretation made by the Judicial
Yuan and another by the Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan 0 holding that a
"world-famous mark" is one which is well-known within the territory of the
Republic of China. Since, according to these rulings, the Coca-Cola Company
had marketed its products all over Mainland China before 1949 and since the
Mainland is an integrated part of the territory of the Republic of China, the
trademark "Coca-Cola" should be considered as a "world-famous mark" no
matter whether that company had marketed such products in Taiwan or not.I
(It will be recalled that Coca-Cola was banned from import at that time.)
Here emerged a very interesting question as a result of the takeover of
Mainland China by the Chinese Communist Party. Assuming that Coca-Cola
were not well-known in Taiwan at the time when the judgment was rendered,
the court's holding could stand only on the assumption that Mainland China is
an integrated part of the Republic of China. To foreigners, such an assump-
tion may seem to be in contradiction with reality. However, it is a fact that the
Government does make such a claim. 2
This writer was informed by the attorney who represented CSH in the first
case that, a few years later, when Pepsi-Cola was granted registration by NBS
the reason was that former U.S. President Richard Nixon represented the
Pepsi-Cola Company in its registration proceeding in Taiwan. 3 Whether this
be accurate or mere surmise, several other cola cases followed this
"precedent." Today there are several kinds of cola in the domestic market. At
any rate, the two prior rulings have apparently been overruled defacto by later
administrative practices.
B. THE DEWITT CASE 14
In July 1968, upon application by Dewitt Pharmaceutical Company (DPC),
a British corporation, MOEA reversed a ruling by NBS which had declared
'°The Judicial Yuan is the highest judicial organ of the ROC. The Grand Justices are in charge
of uniform interpretation of law, See Article 79 of the CONSTITUTION.
"'Chu Shui Shuan Foodstuff Co., Ltd. v. NBS, ACJ No. 54-Pan-197 dated September 11, 1965,
GJY, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1966), pp.15-17.
'
2 This is a political issue and is beyond the scope of this study.
13Please note that such information has not been verified.
14ACJ No. 57-Pan-499 dated December 31. 1968. GMOEA, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1969), pp. 38-40.
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null and void the trademark "Dewitts" registered by Huang Wan Hso Phar-
maceutical Works, a local enterprise. An administrative appeal by DPC to the
Executive Yuan was dismissed. DPC then instituted an administrative pro-
ceeding in the Administrative Court. The case was again dismissed for the
following two reasons:
(1) Before 1949, DPC's products, which were marketed in the Shanghai
area only, were not sold in other parts of the country, including Taiwan,
Penghu (Pescadores), Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu. Although DPC had once
registered the trademark "Dewitts" in China, such a mark could not be
treated as a world-famous mark.
(2) The term of the exclusive use of the said trademark owned by DPC ex-
pired on March 20, 1961, and no extension had been requested. Under such
circumstances, it was unlikely that the public would be deceived and,
therefore, Huang Wan Hso was free to use that mark after the expiration date.
C. OTHER CASES
(1) In Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. NBS, 5 the Administrative Court
held that "Valpin", registered by an American pharmaceutical company, was
not similar to "Alipin", registered by Takeda. The main theme of this case
was that to determine whether two trademarks are similar to each other, the
Chinese character and pronunciation should control no matter whether they
are registered in a foreign language or in both Chinese and foreign languages.
(2) In Jih Hsin Chemical Company v. NBS,' 6 MOEA held that "An Shih
Pai Lo" registered by Jih Hsin was not similar to "An Shih Pai Lo" registered
by Tanabe Seiyaku Co., Ltd., Japan, since they are easy to distinguish in
Chinese. (In Chinese, only the first and third characters are the same.)
Moreover, since Tanabe had marketed its products only in Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen and Matsu, its trademark was not a world-famous mark. 7
(3) In Bulova Watch Company Inc. v. NBS, 8 MOEA held that "Bulova"
owned by Bulova Watch company, a New York-based MNE, was not similar
to "Bulla" for the reason that the latter trademark was registered in both
Chinese and English and its design was quite different from the former foreign
trademark.
(14) In Triumph International Ltd. v. NBS,19 the trademark "Triumph In-
"
5ACJ No. 55-Pan-221 dated September 27, 1966, GJY, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1968), pp. 30-31.
16MOEA AAD No. Ching-(60)-Su-39753 dated September 30, 1971, GMOEA, Vol. 3, No. 10
(1971), p. 88.17 1f this logic stands, it would be impossible for a trademark registered in Taiwan after 1949 to
become a "world-famous mark," since the owner concerned is presently prohibited from
marketing his products in Mainland China.
18MOEA AAD No. Ching-Tai-(58)-Su-35889 dated October 18, 1969, GMOEA, vol. 1, No. 11
(1969). pp. 64-65.
'
9MOEA AAD No. Ching-Tai-(58)-Su-32289 dated September 18, 1969, GMOEA, Vol. 1, No.
10 (1969), pp. 38-39.
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ternational" was declared as similar to "Wang Kuan Long" registered by a
local enterprise, since they had the same crown design.
(5) In Shriro (China) Ltd. v. NBS,2 0 it was determined that "International"
registered by Shriro, a Hong Kong company and appropriated to watches, was
not similar to "National" registered by Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,
Ltd., Japan, even though "National" was translated into two Chinese
characters-Kuo Chi meaning 'International," and the said two Chinese
characters were used as part of the registered trademark.
(6) In Mitsubishi Electric Corp. v. NBS,2' it was decided that the trademark
as shown below was not similar to the world-famous
"Mitsubishi" mark-
Ak E
(7) In Osaka Sewing Machine Trading Co. v. NBS, 22 "Zenith" was
recognized as a world-famous trademark owned by Zenith Company, U.S.A.
The appellant was prohibited from appropriating that mark to the use of sew-
ing machines.
(8) In Sankyo Machine Company v. NBS,2 3 the Administrative Court held
that "San Say" (Sankyo in Japanese) was similar to "San Yang" (Sanyo in
Japanese), despite the fact that these two trademarks were concurrently
registered in Japan. The fact that Japanese can easily distinguish these two
marks registered in the Japanese language could not guarantee that Chinese
would also easily distinguish them as registered in the Chinese and English
languages.
2. The Issue of Deception of the Public
A. THE SUNKIST CASE
The leading case on this issue is Vita Cola Enterprise v. NBS24 with Sunkist
Growers Inc., U.S.A., joined as an intervening party. When Vita Cola Enter-
prise (VCE) was granted registration of the trademark "Hua-Chi Sunkist,"
Sunkist Growers filed an application for review of this action. The application
was granted and the said mark declared to be null and void. The case finally
went to the Administrative Court.
In its petition VCE alleged, in essence, the following:
2 0MOEA AAD No. Ching-Tai-(58)-Su-32874 dated September 22, 1969, GMOEA, Vol. 1, No.
10 (1969), p. 42.2 1MOEA AAD No. Ching-Tai-(58)-Su-32951 dated September 23, 1969, GMOEA Vol. 1, No.
10 (1969), p. 46.22MOEA AAD No. Ching-Tai-(58)-Su-36029 dated October 20, 1969, GMOEA, Vol. 1, No. 11
(1969), p. 64.23ACJ No. 59-Pan-299 dated July 18, 1970, GJY, Vol. 13, NO. 7 (1971), pp. 28-29.
24ACJ No. 49-Pan-127 dated December 3, 1960, GJY, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1961), pp. 21-26.
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(1) In order to establish a deception case, it should be proved that the im-
itator has infringed upon a registered trademark. The Sunkist trademark
claimed to be owned by the intervening party, although it was once registered,
had long lost its validity in China.
(2) Sunkist Growers had not proved that its trademark had become a world-
famous mark, since its marketing area in Mainland China before 1949 was
quite limited.
(3) VCE's trademark was appropriated to a different commodity-fruit
sauce.
In dismissing the complaint, the court held that:
(1) Whether the intervening party's trademark was registered in China or
not is immaterial to the establishment of a deception case. It would be suffi-
.cient if the defendant could prove that the applicant's trademark was likely to
deceive the public or cause the public to be misled.
(2) Whether the intervening party's trademark is a world-famous mark is
also irrelevant to a deception case.
(3) Sunkist Growers had marketed orange and fruit juice bearing the
Sunkist mark in Taiwan. Fruit sauce marketed by the plaintiff was of a similar
nature to those marketed by the intervening party. Moreover, the term "Hua
Chi" is generally accepted to mean the United States.2" Under such cir-
cumstances, the public was likely to be misled into believing that the products
produced by VCE were goods manufactured by the intervening party.
B. THE SOIR DE PARIS CASE
In Shanghai Min Yueh Chemical Company v. NBS,2 6 the Administrative
Court held that the "Soir de Paris Lavendar" trademark registered by the
plaintiff was likely to deceive the public since it was similar to "Soir de Paris,"
the well-known perfume trademark owned by Societe'Bourjois Co. of France.
The fact that the French trademark was not registered in the Republic of China
was immaterial in this case.
C. THE ACUTROL CASE
In Welsike Company v. NBS,27 with American Cyanamid Company,
U.S.A., joined as an intervening party, the Administrative Court held that
"Accutrol" registered by Welsike Company was likely to deceive the public
because it was similar to "Accutrol" owned by American Cyanamid Com-
pany, even though "Accutrol" was appropriated to a different kind of com-
251t is interesting to note that the First National City Bank (now Citibank) is called "Hua Chi"
Bank in Chinese.26 ACJ No. 53-Pan-235 dated November 21, 1964, GJY, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1965), pp. 23-25.
27ACJ No. 63-Pan-532 dated September 5, 1974, GJY, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1975), pp. 23-24.
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modity. Moreover, the fact that these two trademarks were all validly
registered in the United States was not necessarily controlling in a Chinese
court.
D. THE SONY CASE
IN Lin Gin-Huei v. NBS,28 MOEA held that although "Sing Li" (Sony)
registered in Chinese by the plaintiff is the same as that registered by the Sony
Company of Japan, it was unlikely that the Chinese mark would cause public
confusion, since it was appropriated to a completely different commodity -
paint. (As is well-known, Sony is an electronics company.)
E. THE KAO SOAP CASE
In Kao Soap Co., Ltd. v. NBS,29 the Administrative Court noted that,
although the trademark "Hua Wang" ("Kao" in Japanese) registered by Hua
Wang Chemical Company, the interested party in this case, was the same as
that registered by the plaintiff, it was appropriated to a different kind of com-
modity-skin lotion. Futhermore, plaintiff marketed its products (soap) only
in Taiwan and some parts of Mainland China occupied by Japan during the
Second World War. On the other hand, the term "Hua Wang" is a Chinese
term and does not imply something Japanese.30 Under these circumstances, it
was unlikely that "Hua Wang" would cause the public to believe that Hua
Wang skin lotion sold by Hua Wang Chemical was produced by Kao Soap
Company.
F. THE SINCLAIR CASE
In San Pon Trading Company v. NBS,3' it was held that the trademark
"SINCLAIR" registered. by the plaintiff, a Japanese corporation, and ap-
propriated to sewing machines, was likely to deceive the public since it was the
same as that used by Sinclair Petroleum Company, U.S.A. The fact that this
Japanese-owned mark was appropriated to a different kind of commodity was
immaterial.
It is to be noted that this case came out differently from the result in Sony,
discussed above, involving a similar situation. But, when the two cases are
analyzed, they appear to be different in the following two aspects:
(1) In Sony, plaintiff registered his trademark in the Chinese language. In
Sinclair, San Pon registered the mark in both Chinese and English languages
2 MOEA AAD No. Ching-(61)-Su-26496 dated September 21, 1972, GMOEA, Vol. 4, No. 10
(1972), p. 31.
29ADJ No. 58-Pan-488 dated December 23, 1969, GJY, Vol. 12, No. 7 (1970), pp. 34-35.
301t is interesting to compare this case with the Sunkist case on this point.3 1ACJ No. 63-Pan-97 dated March 8, 1974, GJY, Vol. 16, No. 7 (1974), pp. 16-18.
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and the English name was exactly the same as that used by the U.S. company.
(2) The plaintiff in the Sony case was a Chinese and one cannot ignore that a
Chinese court may tend to protect a Chinese national. But the plaintiff in the
Sinclair case was a Japanese company.
3. Symbols Representing the Customarily Used Name,
Shape, Quality, or Usefulness of the Commodity
A. THE PFIZER CASE
In the leading decision in this area, Pfizer Corporation v. MOEA, 32 the Ad-
ministrative Court held that the "Pfizer Package Mark in Blue Lettering on
Gold Background" should be cancelled on the ground that the mark contained
(a) "250mg" which was customarily used to represent the quantity of the com-
modity involved in this case; and, (b) "Capsules", which was customarily used
to represent the shape of the trademarked commodity, although other parts of
the trademark-"Pfizer" and "Terramycin"-were valid under the
Trademark Law. Illustrating the main point involved in this case, the Court
noted that a person may use a flower vase as a trademark appropriated to
fabrics manufactured by him, but may not use the same mark to market his
flower vases under the Trademark Law.
B. THE ELI LILL Y CASE
In Eli Lilly and Company v. NBS,33 the Administrative Court held that an
application for registration of the trademark "Parabolic Shape Capsule"
owned by Eli Lilly, an Indiana-based MNE, should not be granted because the
said Capsule was of the same shape as that customarily used by other phar-
maceutical manufacturers in Taiwan.34 The fact that the said trademark has
been validly registered in the United States was not controlling in this case.
C. THE SEVEN-UP CASE
In The Seven-up Co. v. NBS,35 MOEA held that the trademark "7-Up"
must be cancelled since "Up" is a symbol representing the customarily used
quality or usefulness of the commodity involved in the case, namely, fruit
juice. MOEA noted that at page 2798 of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, (1965 ed.) "up" was defined as a beverage effervescent. At page 4
of the American Soft Drink Journal published in July 1956, it was also stated
that "Here's a new lemon for "up" type drinks."
32ACJ No. 54-Pan-184 dated August 28, 1965, GJY, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1966), pp. 21-23.3 3ACJ No. 54-Pan-247 dated December 4, 1965, GJY, Vol. 8, No. 8 (1966), pp. 13-14.
34 The court reiterated this theme in American Cyanamid Company v. Executive Yuan. See ACJ
No. 55-Pan-75 dated May 20, 1966, GJY, Vol. 9, No. 7 (1967), pp. 14-16.35MOEA AAD No. Ching-Tai-(58)-Su-32939 dated September 23, 1969, GMOEA, Vol. 1, No.
10 (1969), pp. 43-44.
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D. THE QUIET KOOL CASE
In National Union Electric Corporation v. NBS,36 MOEA held that
"QUIET KOOL" owned by the plaintiff and appropriated to an air condi-
tioner was not a symbol representing the customarily used name, shape, quali-
ty or usefulness of the trademarked commodity in view of the fact that this
mark was composed of two words one of which (KOOL) was not customarily
used. 37
III. Patent Cases38
A. THE MATSUSHITA CASE 39
Here, the Administrative Court held that a process which had been put into
public use in the Republic of China was not patentable even though new
material was used in utilizing this process to manufacture electric components,
which resulted in the production of better products.
B. THE PACARO CASE
In Pacaro Company v. MOEA, 4° MOEA ruled that the patent owned by the
appellant, a Japanese corporation, must be revoked since the patentee had not
properly put its patented invention into practice for as long as eight years. The
patentee had never manufactured its invented article in Taiwan. That it had
imported a small quantity of its invented article into Taiwan during the past
five years did not qualify it as properly putting an invention into practice.
Under Article 68 of the Patent Law, an invention must be deemed not to have
been properly put into practice if the patentee has caused the whole or great
part of his invented article to be manufactured abroad and the product im-
ported into the Republic of China.
It should be noted that a number of attorneys representing foreign patentees
have suggested that article 67 of the Patent Law, 41 providing for revocation of
patent rights if a patented invention has not been put into practice within three
36MOEA AAD No. Ching-(63)-Su-10604 dated April 26, 1974, GMOEA, Vol. 6, No. 9 (1974),
p. 13. Note that the plaintiff is a Philadelphia-based corporation.37In another case involving a Belgian corporation, MOEA held that "COPYRAPID" ap-
propriated to a camera did not fall within Article 37, item 10. See MOEA AAD No. Ching-(64)-
Su-21330 dated September 8, 1975, GMOEA, Vol. 7, No. 18 (1975), pp. 18-19.38The Patent Law of the Republic of China was first promulgated on May 29, 1944 effective
January 1, 1948.39ACJ No. 64-Pan-420 dated August 8, 1975, GJY, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1976), pp. 25-26.
4°MOEA AAD No. Ching-(62)-Su-38296 dated November 30, 1973, GMOEA, Vol. 5, No. 23
(1973), p. 25.4 1Article 67 of the Patent Law provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Where, in the absence of proper reasons, a patented invention has not been put into practice, or
has not been properly put into practice, in this country within three years from the date of
granting of the patent, the Patent Office may, on its own initiative, revoke the patent right ....
(Emphasis added.)
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years from the date of granting of the patent, be done away with to encourage
more transfer of technology from foreign patentees. 2 In order to prevent
possible abuses of monopoly power acquired by the patentee from a patented
invention, however, it is submitted that this article should be preserved. Since
under that article the Patent Office may not revoke a patented invention if
proper reasons for delay have been shown, the remedy for a justifiable delay in
putting an invention into practice ought to lie in the relaxation of "proper
reasons" and not the repeal of the entire article.
C. THE MATSUSHITA CASE
In 1971, Osca Electric Company, a local electronics enterprise, manufac-
tured radios for export by initating a new design originally created by a Mr. J.
M. Willmin, a British citizen. On November 21, 1973, the police, after being
informed by Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., that Osca had infringed
its registered patent, attached all the inventories he had manufactured.
When Matsushita first applied for registration of the new design involved in
this case, it represented that the design was originally created by a Japanese.
However, according to Matsushita's advertisements put in Japan, the new
design was originally created by J. M. Willmin. At the end of the investigation
of this case made by NBS, Matsushita claimed that J. M. Willmin had
transferred his patented new design to Matsushita. NBS finally revoked the
design because of Matsushita's misrepresentations.
The accuracy of this account, which is drawn from an unofficial report in a
Chinese publication, 43 could not be verified." But at least, it illustrates the
problem of an imitation of patented new design by both Chinese and Japanese
corporations.
IV. Conclusion
The foregoing summaries confirm the statement with which the present
paper began: most litigants of trademark and patent actions are foreign enter-
prises, especially those of multinational character based in the United States
and Japan. This is apparently due to the fact that these large corporations
possess sufficient resources to promote their trademarks and develop their
patentable inventions. This phenomenon of foreign domination may cause
some uneasiness in the host country as can be inferred from the charge made
by the plaintiff in the Coca-Cola case.
When a foreign enterprise applies for registration of its trademarks in the
Republic of China, it should bear in mind that Chinese standards and not stan-
42Economic Daily News, February 9, 1976, p. 6.
43See CHINA MAGAZINE, Vol. 13, No. 145 (August 1975), pp. 22-25, 36-41, and 59.
"The Gazette of the MOEA did not report this case.
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dards prevailing in its home country will govern. A mark registrable in the
home country is not necessarily registrable in the host country. In this connec-
tion, it should hardly be necessary to caution that it is always preferable for a
foreign corporation to retain local counsel to review an application before it is
submitted.
This survey of cases involving foreign entities does not evidence any in-
justices done to foreign enterprises. Except for the Coca-Cola case, the conclu-
sion reached by the Administrative Court in each case seems sound and
justified. The major deficiency may be that the Court, like other civil courts of
the ROC, is not particularly distinguished by its legal reasQning. Quite often, a
conclusion is reached without much elaboration. An improvement in the ra-
tionale of its decisions would help to make them more convincing.
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